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THE POLITICIZATION AND DEATH 
OF REBUS SIC STANTIBUS 
Since 1968, the countries comprising the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC), and particularly those bordering the Per-
sian/ Arabian Gulf, have been moving toward a markedly different view 
of their mineral resources. With the recent oil embargo and the concomi-
tant use of petroleum as a "weapon," the transformation is complete; 
the States involved now consider their natural resources to be a political 
tool 1 rather than simply an income-producing good. Instrumental in this 
transformation has been the concept of rebus sic stantibus, and it is the 
objective of this article to illustrate the use to which the doctrine has 
been put, and its subsequent demise as an effective legal tool. 
I. THE DOCTRINE 
Rebus sic stantibus2 is a doctrine which, in simple terms, holds that 
an agreement may, when certain conditions are met, be partially or 
wholly abrogated. The conditions necessary may be detailed in the 
agreement itself, but more often the agreement is silent not only as to 
the particular conditions neces~ary, hut also as to recognition of the 
doctrine itself. 
Primarily for this reason, 3 the progression of the principle into rec-
ognized law has been laborious. Grotius first marked it as a viable con-
cept in 1620, 4 but it was not until 1929 that it achieved a place in a 
written compilation of the law.5 Since 1929 it has moved through two 
major codifications, 6 the most recent being in 1969.7 
I. "Politics" or "political" should be taken to mean "national": thus, "political 
goals" refer to such inherently national objectives as economic independence and national 
self-sufficiency, both of which are avowed goals of the Persian/Arabian Gulf countries 
under consideration here. 
2. Literally, "at this point in affairs; in these circumstances." BLACK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY 14:32 (4th ed . 1951). 
:3. Primarily, but not exclusively: in all times and in all circumstances in which rebus 
sic stantibus has been called upon, the countervailing force of pacta sunt servanda has 
been applied. This latter doctrine, with its command of logic and centuries of use, has 
been the primary additional force opposing the translation of rebus sic stantibus from 
theory into practice . For the definitive discussion on the relative merits of rebus sic 
stantibus and pacta sunt servanda, see LORD McNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 491 et seq. 
(1961 ). 
4. H. GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE, XVI, 25 (1925). 
5. Harvard Law School, Research in International Law, III, Law of Treaties, 29 AM . 
• J. INT'L L. 1096-1126 (Supp. 1935). 
6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 153 
0965) . 
7. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 8 INT'L LEG. MAT. 679-768 (1970). 
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These three codifications and the arguments surrounding them8 
have considered rebus sic stantibus as an element of treaty law, and it 
is within the law of treaties that the doctrine has achieved most of its 
growth. Several Western systems of law, however, consider the doctrine 
to be a part of their contract law, 9 and, as will appear later in this articie, 
the principle is firmly embedded in the law surrounding the 
interpretation of oil concession agreements in the Middle East. 
There has been considerable judicial reluctance to embrace the 
theory; w in fact, a recent International Court of Justice opinion implies 
that the use of the doctrine in international jurisprudence is virtually 
nonexistent. 11 This reluctance, however, has not extended to the inter-
national business community. On the contrary, while the principle 
seems to have reached a point of stagnation in its original milieu of 
treaty law, it has flowered abundantly in the rich soil of commercial 
disputes. In the process, most of the arguments which have gone into 
interpreting the doctrine within the framework of a treaty have been 
adopted by its advocates and detractors in the business world, 12 leading 
to the same spirited arguments found in the Comments to both the 
Harvard Research and the Vienna Convention, as well as the literature 
surrounding them. 1:1 
These arguments have taken on an added dimension with the intro-
duction of the political considerations inherent in the huge multina-
tional corporate investments present in the Middle East Gulf States, 
where the pattern is for one or several private corporations to contract 
directly with a State for the exploitation of the mineral resources of the 
State. 14 With the State as one party to a private contract, it is inevitable 
that the State's political objectives ultimately intrude into the contrac-
tual relationship, often subjugating that relationship to purely political 
goals. Such has been the case in the Middle East, where the new-found 
8. These arguments are beyond the scope of this paper. The reader is referred to the 
Comments attached to the Harvard Research and the Vienna Convention for additional 
information on this question. 
9. See uenerally, MILNER's CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 860 et seq. (S.M . 
Waddams ed. 1971), and authorities cited therein. 
10. 'The doctrine came close to judicial review several times since 1929; never, how-
ever, was it actually considered by the courts. For an extensive treatment of the subject, 
see Lessitzyn, Treaties and Changed Circumstances, 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 909 (1967) and 
authorities cited therein. 
11. Fisheries .Jurisdiction Case, [1973) l.C.J. 3. For an analysis of this case and its 
implications for rebus sic stantibus, see Tiewul, The Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases (1973) 
and the Ghost of Rebus Sic Stantibus, 6 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & PoL. 455 (1973). 
12. See note 48 infra and accompanying text. 
rn. See notes 5 & 7 supra. 
14. As reference to Appendix I indicates, this has been the pattern in the Middle East 
countries bordering on the Persian/Arabian Gulf. 
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"oil weapon" has evolved directly from the private contractual relation-
ship. In the process, the countries bordering on the Persian/ Arabian 
Gulf have "politicized"15 the legal concept of rebus sic stantibus by 
using it as the "legal" tool to justify the increasingly State-oriented 
direction of the petroleum industry. In the end, the transformation of 
the industry complete, the principle, in its legal context, has been left 
a shell with little utility. 
II. BACKGROUND FOR POLITICIZATION 
A. The Participants 
The Organ.ization of Petroleum Exporting Countries is a cartel com-
posed of eleven oil-producing States. 16 Founded in 1960, OPEC has 
grown in importance to the point where it is the paramount bargaining 
agent for the governments of its Member States. In that capacity, it has 
relied on the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus extensively. Considering 
that OPEC is an organization composed of States, it is both logical and 
correct to assume that its policies and goals reflect the view of the 
petroleum world held , by the governments of the Member States.'7 Con-
sequently, the politicization of the doctrine becomes a factor with which 
to contend, for the words (and, more recently, the actions18) of the Or-
ganization and the governments have become inseparable. It is the doc-
trine of rebus sic stantibus-in its transformed, political sense-which 
has been instrumental in linking the Organization (reflecting the oil 
industry) to the governments' political goals. 19 
This extreme degree of politicization is a recent development in the 
doctrine of rebus sic stantibus. There was a time when the doctrine was 
seen in its traditional aspect, as a strictly legal theory useful in justifying 
the mitigations of seemingly harsh contractual terms. In this legal sense, 
it has been an integral element of the OPEC analysis of the posted price 
question20 since 1968, when OPEC passed Resolution XVI. 90, stating 
in concrete terms the OPEC expectation that "changing circumstances" 
15. See note 1 supra. 
16. The Middle East countries involved are Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Abu 
Dhabi and Qatar. These are the countries which will be considered in this article. 
17. "The principle aim of our organization (OPEC) has been and still is the coordina-
tion and unification of the petroleum policies of its member countries and the determina-
tion of the best means for safeguarding their interests." Address by Dr. Nadim Pachachi, 
Secretary-General of OPEC, Royal Institute of International Affairs, May 19, 1972, in XV 
Mmm.F. EAST EcoN. SURVEY, May 19, 1972 (Supp.). 
18. That is, the unilateral raise in posted prices and the oil embargo, both discussed 
later in this article. 
19. And, of course, which has led to such actions as unilateral price raises, price 
freezes, and the oil embargo. 
20. See §§ Il(B) and IIl(A) infra and accompanying notes . 
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would-not should-be the basis for the revision of existing concession 
agreements at predetermined intervals in the future. 21 The legal applica-
tion of the doctrine to the posted price question represents the conven-
tional usage of the concept. 22 It is only when one approaches the 
participation question23 that the political use of the doctrine becomes 
obvious. Without the success of the doctrine's use in the posted price 
question, however, it would have been unusable in the participation 
question, and thus not amenable to the politicization which has permit-
ted the State-oriented direction of the industry. 
The doctrine of rebus sic stantibus has been used most effectively, 
both during its transitional stage and following its complete transfor-
mation, against the oil companies and consortiums holding concessions 
in the Gulf area. 24 As will be demonstrated fully in subsequent sections 
of this article, all of the primary price and participation agreements 
between the Gulf States and their respective concession-holders have 
been abrogated in whole or in part. In all cases reliance has been placed 
on the increasingly politicized principle of rebus sic stantibus. 
B. The Issues and the Agreements 
As already noted, the issues of posted prices and participation are 
the two matters being used to trace the transformation of the doctrine. 
Conceptually, these terms pose no problems. Posted prices are those 
"prices" which, once calculated, are used as the basis for the calculation 
of the host government's income per barrel of crude oil exported. 25 Par-
ticipation is a shorthand term representing the governments' demands 
that each State own a share of the assets of the concession-holding 
companies-that is, that they own outright some part of the facilities 
having to do with the extraction process. 
There are two additional issues, the dramatic unilateral raise in 
posted prices211 and the oil embargo of 1973-74, which cannot be ignored 
in a discussion of the transformation of the rebus sic stantibus doctrine. 
21 . "In any event, the terms and conditions of such contracts shall be open to revision 
at predetermined intervals, as justified by changing circumstances. Such changing cir-
cumstances should call for the revision of existing concession agreements." Reproduced 
in XII Mmm,E EAST EcoN. SURVEY, July 11, 1969 (Supp.). 
22. "Conventional" is here intended to express the recent utilization of the doctrine 
in a commercial context, not in the older and more established treaty context. 
23. See §§ Il(B) and IIl(B) infra. 
24. Appendix I outlines the companies holding concessions in each of the Per-
sian/ Ara hi an Gulf countries under consideration here. 
2n. The host governments' incomes consist of royalties and income tax: the royalty 
is a fiat 12 1/2% of the posted price, and the income tax rate is 55% of the posted price. 
Thus, the figure arrived at for the posted price has a dramatic impact on host government 
income, although it is not per se determinative. 
26. 70"r . 
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These occurrences, although not representative of the transformation 
process, illustrate the end result of the politicization of the doctrine in 
the Middle East. In these cases, no mention was made of rebus sic 
stantibus for the simple reason that it was no longer necessary. By adroit 
manipulation of the principle in previous years and in regard to previous 
issues, 27 the host governments had come to the point where they no 
longer needed the legal/political umbrella of the doctrine; that is, they 
could simply do as they wished, using the industry in as political a 
fashion as they liked. 
For the purposes of demonstrating the politicization of the princi-
ple, four agreements between the OPEC Gulf countries and their 
concession-holders will be considered. The Teheran Price Agreement, 28 
signed February 1, 1971, is a five-year price agreement between the Gulf 
States and their respective concession-holding companies. In relevant 
part, the Agreement establishes posted price levels, and indicates that 
the Parties agree that no support shall be given to any Gulf country 
which tries to increase its take to a point above that agreed upon in the 
contract. 211 
From at least one point of view, that latter Agreement became a 
nullity less than a year later, when, in the face of insistent demands by 
OPEC for a raise in posted prices due to the devaluation of the United 
States dollar (upon which, in part, the prices are based), the Geneva 
Agreement on Parity30 was signed between the same parties as the Te-
heran Agreement. The practical effect of this Agreement and the events 
stemming from it has been to nullify the Teheran Agreement, originally 
a five-year pact.:11 
Eighteen months after the signing of Geneva I, and after considera-
ble fluctuation in the value of the dollar, 32 an agreement called the 
Supplemental Agreement was signed, 33 again between the. parties to 
the original Teheran Agreement. As with Geneva I, the thrust of Geneva 
II was a raise in posted prices, allegedly to compensate the countries for 
their losses resulting from devaluation of the dollar. 
Before the signing of both Geneva pacts, a great deal of OPEC time 
was given over to justifying the demands for higher prices, seemingly at 
odds with the original Teheran Agreement. The point of including these 
27. That is, the issues of participation and posted price. 
28. Reprinted in XIV MIDDLE EAST EcoN. SURVEY, February 19, 1971 (Supp.) 
I hereinafter cited as Teheran Agreement!. 
29. Teheran Agreement § 3(b). 
ao. Reprinted in xv MIDDLE EAST ECON. SURVEY, January 21, 1972 (Supp.). 
:n. Teheran Agreement § 2. 
:{2. Most notably, an across-the-board devaluation of 10%. 
a:{. Reprinted in PETROLEUM INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY, June 11, 1973 (Supp.) 
I hereinafter cited as Geneva III. 
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justifications in the following section of this article is to demonstrate the 
successes which OPEC obtained by the conventional use of the doctrine 
rebus sic stantibus. These successes, in turn, led to the successes of the 
participation demands, during the course of which the true transforma-
tion of the doctrine took place. 
The fourth agreement considered here is the General Agreement on 
Participation,=11 signed October 5, 1972 between the countries of Abu 
Dhabi and Saudi Arabia and their respective concession-holders.:15 This 
Agreement represents the second stage of the three-stage transformation 
of the oil industry, and the one in which the politicization of rebus sic 
stantibus was the most dramatic. It is here that the doctrine was used 
to justify a demand commercial in nature, but evolving out of non-
commercial (i.e.,. political) goals, although the medium through which 
the demand was being carried out-the oil industry-was commercial 
in nature. It is, in other words, the stepping stone between the industry 
as an income-producing vehicle, and the industiy as a political exten-
sion of the State, and rebus sic stantibus was the argument used to 
justify the transition. 
III. THE POLITICIZATION 
A. Step 1: The Posted Price Question 
OPEC's 1968 Resolution36 set the stage for the utilization of rebus 
sic stantibus as the validating doctrine in any oil concession agreement 
modification. 
The Teheran Price Agreement, the basis for subsequent alterations 
of the posted price figures, 37 was preceded by extensive attempts at 
justifica:ion of the principle in traditional fashion. Thus, when the Chief 
of OPEC 's Legal Department chose to speak on the subject to the OPEC 
Seminar on Petroleum Economics less than a year before the Teheran 
Agreement was signed,=1K he engaged upon an exhaustive historical anal-
ysis of the doctrine, citing its ongoing validity in international law and 
:M . Reprinted in XVI MIDDLE EAST EcoN. SURVEY, December 22, 1973 (Supp.). 
:lfi. Shortly after Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia signed the Agreement, Qatar and 
Kuwait joined. Kuwait's Parliament, however, never ratified that signature, leaving Ku-
wait without a participation agreement. Recent developments indicate that Kuwait will 
soon have an agreement giving them 60% participation (as opposed to the General Agree-
ment's 2fi<'r ). Should this come about, it is likely that the three signatories mentioned will 
demand a revision of the General Agreement to bring their participation share into line 
with Kuwait's . 
:l6. See note 21 supra. 
:l7. That. is, Genevas I and II, notes 30 & 33 supra. 
:l8. Address by Dr. Hasan S. Zakariya, OPEC Seminar on Petroleum Economics, 
.July :l, 1969, reprinted in XII MIDDLE EAST ECON. SURVEY, July 11, 1969 (Supp.). 
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the law of treaties, :19 several leading systems of municipal law (including 
the OPEC Member Countries), 40 as well as ethics, philosophy and the 
general theory of law. 41 While not without their detractors, 42 these (and 
related':i) attempts at justification served to make the point that rebus 
sic stantibus was certainly a principle of international law of sufficient 
stature to employ as a foundation argument. Only briefly noted at this 
time and in reference to this question was that aspect of the justification 
which would becorr.e so· important later on; that is, that petroleum 
concessions, by their very nature, are somehow different from other 
international agreements in the vast element of public interest repre-
sented by a contract between a State and a private investor. 44 
In 1970, sensing future fluctuation in the value of their supporting 
currency, OPEC passed Resolution XXL 122, 45 stating that posted 
prices would be adjusted to reflect any changes in the parities of any 
monies directly or indirectly affecting the purchasing power of the 
OPEC members. At this point the stage was set for the demands for the 
Conference which ultimately led to the drafting of Geneva I. Thus, by 
August of 1971, OPEC's Secretary-General was quoted as saying that 
"the Teheran ... Price Agreement did not deal with the question of 
the parity of money and, therefore, should the United States dollar be 
devalued, the gains achieved by the Teheran Agreement would be sub-
stantially eroded."46 In other words, due to a dramatic change in circum-
stances, unanticipated at the time the Teheran Agreement was signed, 
OPEC felt justified in calling for a revision of the posted price figures. 
Apparently, that feeling was justified, for scarcely five months later, 
Geneva I was signed, bringing into effect new posted prices designed to 
reflect the fluctuations of the dollar's value.47 
39. Id. at 3-7. 
40. Id. at 7-11. 
41. Id. at 13. 
42. For instance, it has been argued, in the context of the concession agreements, that 
rebus sic stantibus looks, at best, only to the termination of an agreement, not the simple 
alteration of a part thereof. See note 46 infra and sources cited therein. 
43. Letter from Mohammad Talaat Al Ghunaimi, Legal Advisor to the Ministry of 
Petroleum and Mineral Resources of Saudi Arabia, to the Editor, MIDDLE EAST EcoN. 
SURVEY, January 1969 and letter from Mr. Khairy Manna, formerly of the OPEC Secretar-
iat and an official of the Kuwait Ministry of Finance and Oil, to the Editor, MIDDLE EAST 
EcoN. SURVEY, January 1969, in both of which the principle was defended as a basic 
principle of international relations. 
44. See note 38 supra. 
45. In relevant part, Resolution XXL 122 reads: 
" . . . in case of changes in the parity of monies of major industrialized coun-
tries' oil revenues, posted prices should be adjusted to reflect such changes." 
Reprinted in XIV MIDDLE EAST ECON. SURVEY, August 20, 1971 (Supp.). 
46. Interview with Dr. Nadim Pachachi, in Beirut, August 18, 1971. 
47. The Agreement was actually signed on January 20, 1972. 
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It is to be emphasized that this interpretation of rebus sic stantibus 
is a conventional one. It operates within the commercial sphere, on 
purely commercial matters. So it was with Geneva II; again, a commer-
cial matter was being settled by use of a recognized (though not wholly 
endorsed 111) principle within the commercial context. 
The basis for Geneva II was, again, a devaluation of the United 
States dollar. Signed in June 1973, the Supplemental Agreement was 
preceded by a call to the logic of rebus sic stantibus similar to that 
preceding Geneva I. Again the Secretary-General of OPEC considered 
the justification, although in considerably stronger terms: "They [the 
oil companiesJ must give up once and for all the concept of a fossilized 
contract and train their vision to the sight of a living, evolving develop-
ing contract."411 Later in the same address, Dr. Pachachi indicated that 
"It is neither fair nor logical that the developing countries should bear 
the financial consequences of national policies followed by some great 
powers to achieve national aims in Vietnam or the Middle East. "50 In 
other words, any change in the value of the OPEC countries' supporting 
currencies, for whatever reason, was sufficient "change in circum-
stance" to justify a revision of Teheran's posted prices, contract provi-
sions to the contrary notwithstanding.51 
The sum total of the Geneva modifications to the original Teheran 
Agreement was the successful invocation of rebus sic stantibus on two 
occasions. On both occasions, the principle was interpreted in a conven-
tional, commercial sense. However, the foundation had been laid for the 
novel interpretation that would precipitate the demise of the doctrine 
as a strictly legal tool. 
B. Step 2: The Participation Question 
The participation question, by its very nature, engendered a more 
rapid and more explicit politicization of the principle. For the first time, 
demands were being made within the commercial context, but based on 
goals outside that context. 52 Simply, the countries wanted more control 
over the production of crude exports, not only as a means to generating 
additional income but also as a means of assuring later self-sufficiency 
and economic independence. Thus, in the months before the signing of 
the General Agreement on Participation, both OPEC officials and inde-
pendent State representatives were calling for agreement on the issue. 5.'J 
48. See note 42 supra. 
49. Address by Dr. Nadim Pachachi, Royal Institute of International Affairs, May 
19, 1972, reprinted in XV MIDDLE EAST EcoN. SURVEY, May 19, 1972. 
50. Id. 
51. Cf. Teheran Agreement § 3(b). 
52. That is, such goals as economic independence and national self-sufficiency. 
53. For example, Mr. Khairy Manna's and Dr. Al Ghunaimi's letters to the Editor 
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Their basis was the same as in the posted price question, as evidenced 
by the statement of the Saudi Arabian Minister of Petroleum and 
Mineral Resources: ". . . a fundamental change has occurred in the 
economic structure of the international oil industry. . . . [O]ur origi-
nal participation bid was based on the principle of changing circumstan-
ces, and, as I see it, the new changes which have taken place ... make 
participation a national demand."54 Note the terminology: participation 
had become a "nati0nal aemand" -this is, it has transcended the com-
mercial context which gave it birth and moved into national (e.g., politi-
cal) prominence. 
OPEC, too, planted its participation demands squarely on the foun-
dation stone of rebus sic stantibus. In 1971, shortly after the Saudi 
statement, the OPEC Committee designed to study and report on the 
rationale and mechanics of the participation demand started their re-
port with a justification based on the doctrine: 
The main backing for OPEC's legal case as regards the participation 
demand is the principle of change of circumstances, with particular 
reference to the fact that host government participation has become the 
general rule.55 
In other words, there was little question that rebus sic stantibus, in its 
guise as a legal theory, was considered to be the basis for the inherently 
political demand of participation by the host government in the produc-
tion process. To further bolster the demand, the governments let it be 
known that, should OPEC fail to reach agreement with the companies, 
the host governments would have "no alternative but to implement the 
demand through unilateral legislation" -that is, nationalization. 58 
The final step in the politicization came early in 1972, when King 
Faisal, the Saudi Arabian Head of State, publicly brought the full pres-
sure of his office to bear on the question. In a short statement delivered 
by Yamani, the King indicated that: 
The implementation of effective participation is imperative and we 
expect the companies to cooperate with us with a view to reaching a 
satisfactory agreement. They should not oblige us to take measures in 
order to put into effect the implementation of participation.57 
This was the first time that the King-or any other similar ranking 
State official-had made a statement on the question, and it served to 
of .January, 1969. See note 43 supra. 
54. Interview with Shiakh Ahmad Zaki Yamani, Minister of Petroleum and Mineral 
Resources for Saudi Arabia, in Beirut, July 1, 1971. 
55. XIV MIDDLE EAST EcoN. SURVEY, September 24, 1971. 
56. XV MIDDLE EAST EcoN. SURVEY, January 28, 1972. 
57. XV MIDDLE EAST EcoN. SURVEY, February 1, 1972. 
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demonstrate the national implications of the issue more clearly than any 
previous action. 
Thus, the OPEC countries had put the full weight of their State 
influence behind the participation issue, and had supported it with the 
"legal" principle of change of circumstance. It is not surprising that, five 
months after King Faisal's announcement, the General Agreement on 
Participation was signed. 511 
Participation was the first major victory for the "political" rebus sic 
stantibus. The doctrine was no longer purely legal in nature, but, in the 
view of the OPEC countries, it had eased the transition from viewing 
the oil resources as a commercial entity to viewing them as a political 
entity. 
C. Recent Developments 
Two events subsequent to Geneva II and the General Agreement on 
Participation warrant notice here, not for what they add to the politici-
zation of the doctrine, but for what they show to be the effects of that 
poli ticiza ti on. 
By September 1973 it had become clear from OPEC's point of view 
that the Teheran Agreement could no longer stand the pressure being 
exerted on it by the world monetary ftuctuations. 59 In an interview con-
ducted during the first week in September, Shaikh Yamani indicated 
that "The Teheran Agreement is either dead or dying and is in need of 
extensive revision .... [T]here has been a dramatic change in cir'" 
cumstances . . . namely, a fierce upward pressure on prices. . . . "60 In 
other words, the OPEC countries now desired to substantially alter, to 
an extent much greater than before, the Teheran Agreement. 
On September 15 a conference-essentially a Geneva III-was con-
vened, with the same purposes as Genevas I and II. By mid-October it 
was apparent from the producing countries' point of view that little or 
no satisfaction was being derived from the discussions as they were then 
progressing. Thus, in a move simultaneously unprecedented and logi-
cally following from the past, the countries unilaterally raised the posted 
prices, abrogating the Teheran Agreement and the two supplemental 
agreements. 61 
58. The actual date of the signing was December 20, 1972. 
59. At this point, virtually all major currencies were floating and neither the United 
States dollar nor the Pound Sterling was at all stable. This, in turn, led to instability in 
terms of the purchasing power generated by the concession agreements. 
60. Interview with Shaikh Ahmad Zaki Yamani, in Beirut, September 7, 1973. 
61. XVI MIDDLE EAST EcoN. SURVEY, October 13, 1973. Additionally, effective Janu-
ary 1, 1974, the OPEC countries unilaterally froze their prices. The freeze received a three 
month extension on March 1, 1974. 
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In a related move, the same countries, only one day later, launched 
what has come to be called the "oil weapon" by announcing a reduction 
in output to continue until the uniquely political objective of the return 
of the occupied Sinai lands to Arab control was effectuated. 62 This em-
bargo, relaxed in March, 63 realizes fully the impact of oil as a political 
tool, and completes the transformation of the industry. As noted above, 
the governments have no call to rebus sic stantibus or any other validat-
ing doctrine, as there was no longer a need to justify their acts; the 
principle had done its work well. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The doctrine of rebus sic stantibus has been severely altered in its 
application in the Persian/Arabian Gulf oil-producing countries. This is 
not to say that it is necessarily valueless in international relations. 
Rather, the doctrine, at one time a strictly legal justification for unilat-
eral action taken in response to adverse treaty and commercial develop-
ments, has been transformed into a rationale for unilateral commercial 
demands founded on exclusively political goals. This transformation of 
the concept, coupled with the International Court of Justice's rejection 
of its application in 1973, signify the death of rebus sic stantibus as a 
purely legal theory. Whether or not the concept will retain vitality as a 
political tool remains to be seen; it is unlikely, however, that the multin-
ational corporations analogous to the oil companies will sit by passively 
while an increasingly sophisticated interpretation of the principle is 
utilized against them. Rather, we are likely to see an increased aware-
ness of the doctrine's power, with a correspondingly increased respect 
accorded the potential use of that power. 
William L. Schetfier 
62. Id. 
6:1. That is, on March 18, 1974. 
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APPENDIX I 
The following is a break-down of the Persian/Arabian Gulf countries and the concession-
holders operating in them. Column A lists the countries; Column B, the companies: 
A 
Iran 
Kuwait 
Iraq 
Abu Dhabi 
Qatar 
Saudi Arabia 
B 
The Iranian Consortium, composed of Exxon, 
Texaco, Mobil, Standard Oil of California, 
Gulf, British Petroleum, Shell, Compagnie 
Francaise des Petroleum, and Iricon, a company 
composed of six United States firms. 
British Petroleum, Gulf. 
British Petroleum, Shell, Compagnie Francaises 
des Petroleum. 
British Petroleum, Shell, Compagnie Francaises 
des Petroleum, Exxon, Mobil, Partex, repre-
senting the Gulbenkian Foundation's holdings. 
Identical to Abu Dhabi. 
Aramco, composed of: Texaco, Standard Oil of 
California, Exxon, Mobil. 
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